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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kenneth Franklin Felder appeals from the district court's Judgment and
Commitment Order sentencing him to concurrent sentences of twenty five years, with
ten years fixed, following his conviction on three counts of lewd conduct. Mr. Felder
asserts that his rights to due process and a fair trial, guaranteed by the United States
and Idaho Constitutions, were violated because of the prosecutor's misconduct in this
case.

Mr. Felder also contends the district court abused its discretion when it

sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty five years, with ten years fixed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns
In 2007, Mr. Felder was indicted on three counts of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen for acts allegedly committed against his step-daughter, A.K. (R., pp.1213.) The case proceeded to trial and a mistrial was declared after the jury informed the
court it was deadlocked. (R., pp.74-75.) Approximately two months later, a new trial
was held. (R., pp.80-90.) At trial, Mr. Felder maintained his innocence testifying that he
had never inappropriately touched A.K. (Trial Tr., p.289, L.20 - p.290, L.1.)
Mr. Felder was married to A.K.'s mother for approximately three and one-half
years prior to the trial in this case. (Trial Tr., p.257, Ls.15-20.) Mr. Felder testified that
after he moved in, A.K. hated him because he was not her father and he was strict.
(Trial Tr., p.262, Ls.6-17.) Mr. Felder described himself as having "this anal thing about
cleaning" and liked things clean at all times. (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.2-5.) He expected
everyone to carry their own weight and help with the chores. (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.9-17.)
He testified that A.K. had a bigger role than the other children in cleaning because she

was older and taller. (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.9-17.) Although A.K.'s mother would also
sometimes help around the house, she would play on the computer a lot, leaving
Mr. Felder to do most of the cleaning as well as supervising the children while they did
their chores. (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Felder testified that he was basically the
disciplinarian for the household. (Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.1-3.)
A.K. and Mr. Felder frequently clashed over chores and these clashes could go
on for hours in an attempt to get A.K. to do her chores. (Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.4-12, p.267,
Ls.9-18.) Mr. Felder testified that A.K.'s resentment got worse once her father went into
the military and her mother began working nights. (Trial Tr., p.262, Ls.6-17, p.267,
Ls.9-18.)
At trial, Mr. Felder also admitted that he had a bad temper, describing himself as
having "a bad anger problem and a short temper."

(Trial Tr., p.268, Ls.2-23.)

Mr. Felder stated that he lost his temper with A.K. more times than he should have and
that on one occasion he had spanked A.K. with a wooden spoon and told her not to tell
because he was afraid her mother would get angry.

(Trial Tr., p.269, Ls.4-24.)

Mr. Felder testified that, the Sunday before he was arrested, he and A.K. had clashed
after he asked her and her sister to clean up their room. (Trial Tr., p.272, L.9 - p.274,
L.2.) Mr. Felder explained that A.K. swore at him a couple times and that he lost his
temper, "grabbed ahold of her, pinned her up against the wall, and cussed her out," and
punched the wall right next to her head. (Trial Tr., p.274, Ls.8-22.)
Mr. Felder testified that the next day he and his wife were called down to the
police station and he was told that A.K. had alleged that he had inappropriately touched
her. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.24 - p.277, L.20.) Mr. Felder explained that during the interview

they threatened to take the children away, including his son, who he had worked hard to
get custody of. (Trial Tr., p.279, L.8 - p.281, L.25.) Mr. Felder testified that because he
was afraid the children would be taken away, he eventually admitted to inappropriately
touching A.K. (Trial Tr., p.281, Ls.14-25.) At trial, Mr. Felder testified his statements to
officers were not true and that he had never inappropriately touched A.K.

(Trial

Tr., p.289, L.20 - p.290, L.1.)
At trial, A.K. testified that Mr. Felder would touch her and licked her where she
went pee, as well as touch her butt and breasts. (Trial Tr., p.50, L.1 - p.75, L.9.) She
testified that Mr. Felder would touch her in this manner when he was tucking her in for
bed and that this conduct occurred frequently from the time she was in third grade until
she reported the inappropriate touching in fifth grade. (Trial Tr., p.49, L.3 - p.75, L.9.)
After watching a movie on inappropriate touching at school, A.K. told her friend who
went with A.K. to the counselor to report that Mr. Felder had inappropriately touched
A.K. (TrialTr., p.67, L.23-p.69, L.21.)
Officer Zakarian of the Meridian police department testified that he had
interviewed Mr. Felder following A.K.'s report. (Trial Tr., p.208, L.10 - p.209, L.4, p.215,
L.12 - p.218, L.lO.) He testified that, although Mr. Felder was very reluctant to directly
answer his questions about touching A.K. inappropriately,

Mr. Felder eventually

admitted to touching A.K. inappropriately five to ten times. (Trial Tr., p.218, L.6 - p.223,
L.16.) Officer Zakarian stated the Mr. Felder stated that he touched A.K. to harass her
because she did not show him respect or treat him right. (Trial Tr., p.225, Ls.1-7.)
Mr. Felder was found guilty of all three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen.

(R., pp.91-92.)

Mr. Felder was subsequently sentenced to concurrent

sentences of twenty five years, with ten years fixed. (R., pp.97-99.) He filed a timely
Notice of Appeal from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.101-03.) He
also filed an ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion asking that the district
court reduce his sentence. (R., pp.llO-15.)

The district court denied this motion.

(R., pp.115-18.)~

'

Because no new or additional information was provided in support of Mr. Felder's Rule
35 motion, this issue is not being pursued on appeal. See State v. Huffman,l44 ldaho
201,203,159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)
4

ISSUES
1.

Did the State violate Mr. Felder's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutoriai misconduct
during closing arguments?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Felder to twenty
five years, with ten years fixed, to be served concurrently, for three counts of
lewd conduct?

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Violated Mr. Felder's Riaht To A Fair Trial, Guaranteed Bv The Fifth And
Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution And Article I, 6 13 Of The
ldaho Constitution, BVCommittinq Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Durinq
Closing Arquments
A.

Introduction
Mr. Felder asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial, guaranteed

by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, § 13 of the ldaho Constitution, when she impermissibly vouched for the victim
and appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury. Furthermore, this prosecutorial
misconduct committed during closing arguments amounted to fundamental error and
this Court should vacate Mr. Felder's conviction in light of this misconduct.
B.

Standard Of Review
Prosecutorial misconduct will only be reviewed for fundamental error absent an

objection below. State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). The
ldaho Courts have noted that when reviewing fundamental error each case will "stand
on its own merits" and "[olut of the facts in each case will arise the law." State v.
Chrisfiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v.
Bingham, 116 ldaho 415,423,776 P.2d 424 432 (1989)).
C.

Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Violated Mr. Felder's
Riaht To A Fair Trial Bv Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Durina The Closina Arguments
Although there was no objection to the prosecutor's comments during closing

arguments in this case, prosecutorial misconduct can be reviewed for fundamental error

when there has not been an objection made below. See State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559,
571,165 P.3d 273,285 (2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710,715,85 P.3d 1109, 1114
(Ct. App. 2003). A fundamental error is one that "'so profoundly distorts the trial that it
produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due
process."' State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.2d 1175, 1182 (2007)
(quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003); State v.
Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). It has been defined as an error
which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or ...to the foundation of
the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and
which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. (quoting State v. Bingham,
116 ldaho 4 15, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989)).
The ldaho Court of Appeals has held that "[p]rosecutorial misconduct rises to the
level of fundamental error when it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and
arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors
may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." Kuhn, 139 ldaho
at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. The prosecutor's actions or comments must be so egregious
or inflammatory that a curative jury instruction could not have remedied the misconduct.
Id. This reflects the rationale behind the rule, that even if the defendant had made a

timely objection to the inflammatory statements, the objection would not have cured the
inherent prejudice. Id. This also reflects the fact that the trial court itself possesses the
power to sua sponte intervene when prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious
and prejudicial. State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 88 n.2, 156 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (Ct. App.
2007) (noting that "Itlhe trial courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged

to monitor the course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and
to impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right to a fair
trial"). Therefore, when reviewing a question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate
Court must first determine whether the complained about conduct was improper, then, if
so, whether the misconduct impinged on the defendant's right to a fair trial, or whether
the misconduct was harmless. Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 715,85 P.3d at 1114.
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to fundamental
error during the closing arguments by impermissibly vouching for the victim and
impermissibly appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury.
1.

The Prosecutor lm~roperlvVouched For The Victim In This Case During
Her Closinq Arquments

Although the prosecutor is given considerable latitude in his argument and can
permissibly discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from the
evidence, the prosecutor should not express his personal opinion regarding the
credibility of a witness unless the comment is based solely on the evidence presented at
trial. Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. Improper prosecutorial vouching occurs
when the prosecutor uses the prestige of his office to bolster the witness by providing
his assurances in the witnesses' testimony or when the prosecutor indicates that there
is information that was not presented to the jury that would support the witnesses'
testimony. Smith, 962 F.2d at 933-34. Two dangers are presented by a prosecutor's
vouching for a witness. Unifed States v. Weafherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1147-1148 (9th
Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1986)). Vouching can "convey the
impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor,

supports the charges against the defendant" jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Id. Furthermore, "the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the
Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its
own view of the evidence."

Id. "'Vouching for a government witness in closing

argument has often been held to be plain error, reviewable even though no objection
was raised."' Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1379 (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d
530, 534 (9th Cir. 1980)
This case essentially revolved around whether the jury believed the victim's
allegations against the defendant; therefore, establishing the witness as credible was
important for the State. Unfortunately, in attempting to do this, the prosecutor went too
far and vouched for its witness in its closing arguments. In closing the prosecutor
explained:
For you to believe that [A.K.] would somehow be able to make up
these allegations that somehow in doing so, that the state would be able
to wrap itself around the allegations and just happen to find all of these
coincidences would make you think that [A.K.] is so sophisticated and so
smart that she could fool people who do this every day ....
(Trial Tr., p.339, Ls.13-20.)

The prosecutor then went on to explain how A.K.'s

disclosures corresponded with when the defendant began having sole care of her and
how she later became disconnected at school. (Trial Tr., p.339, L.20 - p.340, L.6.) By
arguing that A.K. would have to fool people who do this everyday, including the
prosecutor's office, in attempting to explain why she was believable, the prosecutor was
implicitly saying that the State believes her and the State would not be able to find all
the coincidences if she was not believable. Although the State could certainly argue
that her disclosures coincided with certain facts in this case, by placing itself in the

arguments and implying that the victim could not fool the State, the prosecutor was
vouching for the believability of A.K,
Earlier in the State's closing argument, the prosecutor made similar statements
explaining that if A.K. had made inconsistent statements they would have heard about
it. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:
She tells her friend. Her friend encourages her to tell Ms. Hensley.
She goes to CARES. She tells CARES what happened. And ladies and
gentlemen, what is important about all of this is that each of these persons
has come to testify, not her letter friend ..., but all these other people have
come. And if she had said anything inconsistent, [A.K] had been
inconsistent with Ms. Hensley, with CARES, with what the police
understood, you would have heard about it.
You would have heard about it in cross examination. You would
have heard how he brings out inconsistencies in [A.K.'s] stories, just as
the state did with the defendant and how inconsistent he has been
throughout his entire testimony today with what he told Detective Zakarian
seven and a half months ago. You see, you would have known if [A.K.]
had been inconsistent about any of it, but you never heard about it at all.
(Tr., p.328, L.14 - p.329, L.8.) This argument similarly vouches for the victim, implying
that the prosecutor knows A.K. has never been inconsistent.
In Washingfon v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689 (6'h Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that similar arguments were misconduct. Id. at 700-01. In Hofbauer,
the prosecutor characterized the victim's testimony as being consistent over time,
explaining that several witnesses had testified and that the victim's story had not
changed. Id. at 700. The court found that this was misrepresenting facts in evidence
because none of the witnesses had actually testified to what the victim had told them;
therefore, no evidence was presented to the jury regarding whether or not the victim's
story had changed. Id. The court also noted that if the State had sought to elicit such
testimony it would have been inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 700-01. The court further

found that the purpose of the prosecutor's statements were to improperly bolster the
credibility of the victim, citing the prosecutors statement, "'You think that a ten year old
is going to go through all of that, fool everybody, talking about two instances"' as further
proof of vouching. Id. at 701.
Here, the prosecutor's argument was similar to Hofbauer, arguing that the jury
did not hear any inconsistencies. In addition to vouching for A.K.'s credibility, this
second statement also similarly misrepresented facts in evidence. See Phillips, 144
ldaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587 (stating it is misconduct to mischaracterize the evidence
and argue facts not in evidence.). See also Sfate v. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho 758, 770,
864 P.2d 596, 608 (1993) ("[A] prosecutor has a duty to avoid mischaracterizing
evidence and using inflammatory tactics in closing arguments); Sfafe v. Lovelass, 133
ldaho 160, 983 P.2d 233 (1999). Here, the witnesses also would not have simply been
allowed to testify regarding statements made by the victim unless a hearsay exception
was met. See I.R.E. 801; I.R.E. 803. Furthermore, although defense counsel could
have tried to impeach A.K. with inconsistent statements, this also assumes that defense
counsel knew inconsistent statements were made. Finally, the prosecutor's argument
also shifted the burden to the defense, implying that it was the defense's burden to
show that the A.K.'s statements were inconsistent. See Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86, 156
P.3d at 587 (explaining it is misconduct to misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt
burden). See also Sfafe v. Miles, 139 Wash. App. 879, 162 P.3d 1169 (Wash. App.
Div.2. 2007) ("Although prosecutors have "wide latitude" to make inferences about
witness credibility, it is flagrant misconduct to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant.")

Therefore, Mr. Felder contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when she
made statements during closing argument vouching for the credibility of A.K. and which
also misrepresented the facts in evidence and shifted the burden to the defense.

2.

The Prosecutor lmpermissibly Appealed To The Jurv's Emotions In Her
Closina Arauments

In her closing arguments, the prosecutor also improperly appealled to the
emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury by the use of inflammatory tactics designed
to appeal to the jurors' emotions. See Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86-87, 156 P.3d at 587-88.
It is improper for a prosecutor to urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant by appealing
"to the passions, fears and vulnerabilities of the jury." Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149;
Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86-87, 156 P.3d at 587-88. This includes urging a conviction to
protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking.
Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149. The problem with appeals to emotion is that it
encourages the jury to convict the defendant based on reasons entirely separate from
his own guilt or innocence. Id. Phillips, 144 ldaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588 (quoting
State v. Irwin, 9ldaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903) ("'Nothing should tempt [the
prosecutor] to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make statements to the
jury, which whether true or not, have not been proved."').
When asking the jury to convict Mr. Felder, the prosecutor told the jury "in this
instance, [A.K.] should be seen and heard and believed by you. Convict him for what
he has done to her." (Trial Tr., p.340, Ls.14-18.) These statements by the prosecutor
are appealing to the emotions of the jury and a sense of community justice by asking
the jury to convict the defendant not based on the evidence admitted at trial but to show

the young victim that they believe her and to convict the defendant for the alleged harm
that he has caused her rather than based on the evidence.

Therefore, it was

misconduct for the prosecutor to make these statements.
3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless And Deprived Mr. Felder
Of His Riqht To A Fair Trial

"[Elven when prosecutorial misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the
conviction will not be reversed when that error is harmless." State v. Field, 144 ldaho
559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). In the present case, this Court should find that the
misconduct denied Mr. Felder his right to a fair trial because it cannot say beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned the same verdict if the misconduct
had not occurred. As set forth above, the improper statements by the prosecutor each
individually, or alternatively, viewed as a whole, cannot be harmless. See State

v.

Harrison, 136 ldaho 504, 37 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that under the doctrine of
cumulative error, the, "accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be
harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.").
In this case, the credibility of the victim played an important role. The State
emphasized that the question in this case was whether the jury believed the victim or
Mr. Felder in its closing arguments. (Tr., p.327, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Felder also testified that
he had never touched A.K. inappropriately.

(Trial Tr., p.289, L.20

-

p.290, L.1.)

Therefore, by vouching for the victim and her credibility or believability as a witness as
well as appealing to the jurors' emotions, the State's misconduct easily could have
contributed to the verdict and cannot be said to be harmless.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Felder To Twenty Five
Years, With Ten Years Fixed. To Be Served Concurrentlv. For Three Counts Of Lewd
Conduct
Mr. Felder asserts that, given any view of the facts, his concurrent sentences of
twenty five years, with ten years fixed, are excessive. Where a defendant contends that
the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982).
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75
(1979)). Mr. Felder does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Felder must show that in light
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.
Id. citing State v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled

on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992).

The

governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation;
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho
382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978)). Mr. Felder contends the district court failed to
adequately consider the mitigating factors present in this case when sentencing him,

including his the fact this was Mr. Felder's first felony conviction, Mr. Felder's positive
employment history, and his support from family and friends.
The ldaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131
ldaho 670, 673, 962 P.2d 1054, 1057 (1998).

Additionally, the Court has also

considered the defendant's employment history and the support the defendant has from
his family and friends in his rehabilitation efforts. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91, 645
P.2d 323, 325 (1982) (reducing the defendant's sentence in light of the defendant's
substance abuse problem, the fact is it was the defendant's first felony, and the fact the
defendant was working to help support his children at the time of his conviction);
State v. Shideler, 103 ldaho 593, 594-595, 651 P.2d 527, 528-529 (1982) (reducing
sentence of defendant who had the support of his family and employer in his
rehabilitation efforts).
This was Mr. Felder's first felony offense. (Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinaffer, PSI), pp.3-4.) Prior to this offense,

Mr. Felder continuously maintained

employment, sometimes working two jobs at once. (PSI, p.20.) He was working at
Fleetwood Homes of ldaho until the instant offense occurred and had "good skills in
janitorial services, construction and sheet metal." (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Felder also has the support of his family and friends in his rehabilitation
efforts, receiving letters in support from several family members and friends. (See
Letters from Jonathan W. Fouts, Lori Farrens, Rocky Farrens, Mary A. Schukman, Kim
Felder, Justin and Kris Farrens, Kathy A. Atwood, William Felder, Mary Gadbery, Sarah
Jeffries and Rana Reynolds attaches to the PSI.) Mr. Felder was described as "a good

hearted person who is caring, respectful and a great listener" who worked hard to
support his family. (Letter from Jonathon W. Fouts attached to the PSI; see also Letters
from Mary A. Shukman, Lori Farrens, and Kathy A. Atwood attached to the PSI.)
Mr. Felder "would give you the shirt off his back, whether you needed it or not." (Letter
from Rocky Farrens attached to the PSI.) His sister, Kim Felder, described him as the
best big brother anyone could ask for. (Letter from Kim Felder attached to the PSI.) His
nieces also described Mr. Felder as a loving uncle, who was always there for them and
who had never touched them inappropriately. (Letters from Mary Gadbery and Sarah
Jeffries attached to the PSI.) Mr. Felder's father stated that Mr. Felder was welcome to
come live with him in Arizona if he were released and that there were already job
opportunities for him if he did so. (Letter from William Felder attached to the PSI.)
Mr. Felder contends the district court should have adequately considered the
mitigating circumstances in his case, including the fact that this was his first felony, his
positive employment history and the support he received from family and friends.
Therefore, he contends his concurrent sentences of twenty five years, with ten years
fixed are excessive.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Felder respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand
his case for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Felder respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand his
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
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